

THE ANTHROLOGY OF JOHN MILEY: FREEDOM IN ARMINIANISM

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The systematic theology of John Miley was first published in 1892, in two volumes. It is difficult to determine what his precise influence has been in the history of doctrine. But he does confess to be a consistent Arminian building his doctrine on the fundamental principles of that system. If so, the analysis of his *Doctrine of Man* will dispel or confirm the beliefs of all who profess to follow the Arminian system irrespective of whether they have been directly influenced by the work of Miley, or not.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on what is clearly the cornerstone of all that is distinctive in Arminianism, namely the concept of freedom as applied to man. Then the various implications will be traced out by an examination of some of the important doctrines that depend upon this idea of freedom. Throughout, Miley's postulates will be compared with the plain teaching of the Scripture.

1. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN ARMINIANISM

Miley is very clear in stating what he holds to be the fundamental principle in Arminianism:

Freedom is fundamental in Arminianism. ¹

... the principle of freedom in Arminianism. There is no more fundamental principle. It occupies much the same position in this system that the divine sovereignty occupies in Calvinism. ²

That this is a foundational principle is clear from the fact that so many other doctrines are determined by it, standing or falling with it. Again, Miley is very precise:

Thus the fundamental truth of freedom requires the system in the definite cast of its doctrines. ³

The system holds accordingly the universality and provisional nature of the atonement, and the conditionality of salvation. ⁴

It is obvious that the freedom Miley is referring to is contrary to the doctrines of the Calvinistic system as he has openly distinguished their foundational principles. The one focusses on man (freedom) and the other on God (sovereignty). Calvinists also refer to man as possessing freedom or 'natural liberty' ⁵ in their writings and carefully worded Confessions. So it is next necessary to distinguish between the two by analysing Miley's definition of freedom.

i. Negatively. Miley is totally repelled by anything which has the slightest hint of determinism or necessity. This is the fundamental presupposition causing Arminianism and Calvinism to diverge from the outset. Necessity will be discussed later, but Miley immediately rejects it because he believes it demands the denial of moral responsibility and free personal agency. What is particularly alarming in Miley's treatment of the whole subject of freedom is that in the 36 pages which are devoted to it never once is Scripture quoted or even alluded to! The first reply that must be made to Miley is that he seems to be prejudiced, for if he is able to show that any view involves what he describes as necessity,

¹ Miley, John, *Systematic Theology* (Hunt & Eaton: New York, 1892), 1:275.

² *op. cit.* 1:522.

³ *op. cit.* 1:275.

⁴ *idem.*

⁵ see *The Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter 9, Section 1.

then that is ALL he needs to reject it.⁶ No recognition is paid to the fact that Calvinists, including those who hold a fully-fledged necessitarian doctrine, just as firmly assent to man's responsibility and free agency. Cunningham was involved in the same difficulties as he sought to counter the vicious attacks of Hamilton.⁷ So Miley feels able to reject Calvinism on the a priori basis that the principle of necessity is opposed to true Christianity.

Calvinism is logically determined to a position of necessity by its doctrines of the divine sovereignty, predestination and monergism.⁸

If there is a predestination which does not require the divine agency for its effectuation it cannot be in accord with the determining principles of the Calvinistic system, and may be consistent with freedom and the principles of Arminianism.⁹

Necessity, according to Miley, is the effectual working of forces external to man such that he has no power to accept or reject them. What he does is not determined by his own agency, but by something outside him. Whether or not Calvinists accede to this, or the Bible teaches it, more later.

ii. Positively. For Miley, the essence of humanity is the Arminian doctrine of freedom, or free agency.

For freedom there must be a power of rational self-action ... Freedom lies, not in the constituent faculties of our personality, but in our power of freely using them in personal action. Such power is central to personality itself. Here is the true question of freedom.¹⁰

The fundamental question of freedom hinges around the question of how we make our choices. Necessity implies that choices are made directly upon some impulse which is not determined by the person himself. Freedom of choice, on the other hand, is an act of the personal agency as a result of reflection and judgement. Miley summarizes the process thus: (a) The conception of an end; (b) The desiring of the end to be chosen; (c) Reflection and judgement concerning the end desired; (d) The determination to act, the decision.¹¹ The difference can be illustrated by considering a man who walks past a jeweller's shop. If the law of necessity is true, then if the temptation to sin is the strongest motive within him, steal he must. However, if the man is really free, then when the temptation comes he will reflect and judge the action, and on that basis alone will decide to accept or reject the temptation. Miley admits that there are many occasions when a man actually suspends this power of choice. Is it possible for man defiled by sin to choose the good? Yes, as a result of the universal atonement. The latter is a grace which:

... lifts up man into freedom, with power to choose the good. Such freedom is the condition of moral responsibility; and without it we could be neither sinful nor punishable, because our moral life could not proceed from our own personal agency.¹²

Thus even regeneration is dependent upon a man freely choosing to be so regenerated.

⁶ see discussions in Miley, op. cit. 2:278,280-281.

⁷ Cunningham, William, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation* (London: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1967), 475.

⁸ Miley, op. cit. 2:275.

⁹ *ibid.* 2:276.

¹⁰ *ibid.* 2:273-274.

¹¹ *ibid.* 2:286-287.

¹² *ibid.* 1:522.

Not that this implies self-regeneration, for it is the gracious power of the Holy Spirit that is at work. But the attainment of the end is dependent upon that end being freely elected. Miley concludes:

... through the proper and obligatory use of the powers of our moral agency we can realise the paramount eligibility of the good and choose it against the evil.¹³

Before going on to consider the Biblical answer to these statements, it is necessary to examine in more detail the effect of this fundamental principle in Arminianism on other cardinal doctrines.

2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF FREEDOM TO OTHER DOCTRINES IN ARMINIANISM

(a) The creation of man.

Basically it is because man has personality that makes him a being created in the image of God. This includes both the spiritual nature of man and primitive holiness. It is a character of his holiness that is most germane to this present study. Miley takes his starting point from the supposition that Adam's created holiness could have no actual ethical quality because that can arise only from free personal action.¹⁴ Again the principle of freedom (in the Arminian sense) is determinative in the formulation of the doctrine, rather than the statements of Scripture. In exegesis of Ecclesiastes 7:29, which has direct bearing on this subject, the interpretation that "upright" means 'rectitude of conduct' is dismissed without discussion because of the presupposition of freedom, which in turn is never shown to be Scriptural. Thus the holiness with which Adam was created is limited to a mere quality. Adam's nature had a spontaneous inclination towards holiness.¹⁵

A second element in the holiness of Adam was the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit. Without the power of the Holy Spirit Adam would have had no opportunity to fulfil the demands of probation. Although Miley seems nowhere to state concretely that there is a nature in man, his flesh, that drags him away from holiness, there are indications that this is his doctrine. The flesh is referred to as the 'lower, animal nature'. Also, if man is created holy, why is it that he could not have followed holiness if he had willed it, without the presence of the Holy Spirit? Possibly this is also implied in his doctrine of regeneration.

(b) The fall and its effects.

Man freely and voluntarily chose to disobey God and so as a result was deprived of the Holy Spirit. As the Holy Spirit was given that there might be "... the more thorough subordination of all sensuous impulses and appetencies, and the complete dominance of the moral and spiritual life",¹⁶ so the result of His withdrawal from man was the loss of strength to do good. Thus man became depraved, his flesh and spirit being in disorder and defiled by sin.

The human nature of every man becomes corrupted as a result of the sin of Adam. But such a corrupt nature itself does not make a man liable to divine retribution as, by the same principle of freedom, demerit can only be counted against a *free* sinful *deed*. Here is an inseparable connection between the nature of depravity and original holiness. Miley shows this to be the case for the Augustinian doctrine, and thus by implication for the Arminian.

¹³ *ibid.* 2:305.

¹⁴ *ibid.* 1:409.

¹⁵ *ibid.* 1:421.

¹⁶ *ibid.* 1:444.

As in this doctrine (i.e. the Augustinian) the very nature of man in his fallen state is actually sinful, or sinful in a sense deserving of God's judicial wrath, so that nature of primitive man in itself and without any gracious endowment could be ethically righteous.¹⁷

In consonance with the principle of freedom, Miley often makes an appeal to God's justice in rebutting the Calvinistic doctrines. On these principles he admits that the doctrine of native depravity is necessary to account for the universality of actual sin, but he goes on to deny the necessity for the demerit of depravity. A man is not responsible for the nature with which he is born and therefore God would not be just if He were to make depravity the reason for condemnation. Miley consistently carries out this principle with respect to children who die in infancy. The infant is not responsible for being a descendent of fallen Adam and so Christ regeneratively removes the sinward nature.¹⁸

The foregoing has obvious implications for Miley in the realm of the imputation of Adam's sin. The notion that the relation of all men to Adam is one of representation rather than natural is obnoxious, because it flatly contradicts the fundamental tenets of Arminianism.

...if we could not be sinful and punishable in our actual life without free personal agency, or through morally necessitated evil deeds, how can we be sinful and punishable through the sin of Adam, or on the ground of an inherited nature? Nothing could be more utterly apart from our own agency than the one or the other. Nothing could be imposed by a more absolute necessitation.¹⁹

Thus Miley denies both the representative and the realistic view of accounting for the depravity of all men. He feels that the law of genetic transmission is entirely sufficient to account for this, that is, it is by natural means that corruption is spread to offspring. A noticeable and serious omission in the discussion is a treatment of Romans 5:12-19. Both the representative and realistic views have the same difficulty for Miley; every man thus becomes guilty for the sin of Adam in which he could not have freely concurred. If the question is still raised that men are born depraved through no fault of their own, then Miley appeals to this genetic law that the offspring are always a reproduction of the parentage.²⁰ This he believes he has avoided the problem that depravity is a merely penal infliction by God.

(c) Regeneration

Through the fall into sin of Adam every individual has become depraved by his seminal relationship with Adam. But this depravity does not mean that man is unable to choose the good for, as already noted, the atonement enables men to have this power. Again, free agency, as Miley defines it, is the foundation on the which the doctrine of regeneration rests.

Regeneration is not an absolute work of the Spirit...There are prerequisites which cannot be met without our free agency... There is no regeneration for us without them.²¹

Miley does not want to imply that regeneration, and thus salvation, is dependent upon a

¹⁷ *ibid.* 1:420.

¹⁸ *ibid.* 1:529-530.

¹⁹ *ibid.* 1:522.

²⁰ *ibid.* 1:505,509.

²¹ *ibid.* 2:336.

meritorious work, for he admits that unaided man cannot be saved. Yet if he were to make the aid given by the Holy Spirit effectual then, on the basis of his original definition of freedom, man would no longer be a free agent. Thus the Spirit's work can either be accepted or rejected.

There must be a helping work of the Holy Spirit prior to His work of regeneration... The Holy Spirit enlightens, awakens, and graciously draws us. All this may be without our consent, and even despite our resistance. We may finally resist, or we may yield to the gracious influences, and be born of the Spirit. ²²

The nature of regeneration is firmly rooted in the nature of depravity, which in turn is dependent on the view held of original holiness. None of these three have any ethical standing; they are all subjective states. Through regeneration the filthy moral nature is purified, the Holy Spirit transforming us into His moral likeness. A man becomes ethically holy in the sight of God by the acts of his free agency now that he has a nature disposed towards holiness.

In these three basic doctrines a constant inter-dependency has been noted, one which primarily rests on Miley's insistence that nothing can be predicated of man which implies the negation of that fundamental principle of freedom upon which the whole structure depends. It is first necessary to examine what is the Biblical doctrine of freedom and then determine its relation to the three cardinal doctrines outlines above.

3. FREE AGENCY

(a) Analysis of free agency

The term 'free agency' is to preferred over the more common 'free-will'. When the will is referred to separately there is often the connotation that it is in a state of indifference and can act in any way it chooses. Even Miley recognizes the problem here; in relation to his discussion on depravity he writes of the error of treating the will as a person endowed with the powers of personal agency.

The will is not a person, not in itself agent, but simply an instrumental faculty of mind, which completes its power of personal action. There is no impulse or inclination in the will itself. All impulse and inclination are from the sensibilities. ²³

Murray and Dabney strongly point out that freedom belongs to the person not a faculty. Thus the will is not autonomous, able to do what it chooses. The will depends on 'the immanent disposition of heart and mind' (Murray), his character. The Scripture is definite in affirming that a man acts according to his character. This the constant emphasis is upon man's heart; if it is good he will do good; if bad he will do evil (Proverbs 4:23, Matthew 12:34, 15:18-19, Luke 6:43-45, James 1:13-14). Then does this mean that a man is not free to do what he pleases? No, totally the opposite. A man is so free, for no amount of outside influence can force him to will against the disposition of his heart. Thus man's freedom can be defined both negatively and positively, as 'the absence of compulsion and the presence of self-determination'. Thus man is responsible for his acts because he does what *he* wants to do, and what he wants to do is expressive of *his* innermost self. Thus human action is real, responsible and free. With this analysis Miley would no doubt agree formally. But

²² *ibid.* 2:337.

²³ *ibid.* 1:443.

actually, Miley has introduced a further qualifying principle, that of reflection and judgement on the motive (or inner impulse) prior to the act. He introduces this principle just because he sees the opposite principle of necessity involved in saying that choice is determined by motive.²⁴ It is here that Miley goes far beyond what Scripture would warrant. He has a fear against any form of necessity on the basis of his own reason rather than on the data of Scripture. In that he feels necessity implies man has no responsibility or freedom, he is right; but what he defines as necessity on this basis does not imply loss of responsibility or freedom, according to Scripture. Man *is* clearly under the *necessity* of acting according to *his* nature. There is no Scriptural warrant, even if psychology permits it, to introduce any principle which is free from the inner disposition of a man. In effect Miley separates the person (or personality) of a man from his heart, whereas Scripture identifies the two as inseparably connected.

It was essentially the whole man, with all his attributes, physical, intellectual, and psychological, of which the Hebrew thought and spoke, and the heart was conceived of as the governing centre for all these. It is the heart which makes a man or beast what he is (Proverbs 16:23, 23:7, Daniel 4:16).²⁵

(b) Free agency before the fall

Before he fell, Adam had the power to choose good or evil, to obey or to disobey God's command (Genesis 2:16-17). This is the power of contrary choice, 'the ability to choose between alternatives which are morally antithetical'.²⁶ But to be able to make such contrary choices is not the essence of free agency, for had he succeeded in his probation and had been graciously confirmed in his integrity, he would still have been a free agent. Miley also admits that confirmed blessedness would have been the result. Thus it is with God Himself, who does as He pleases (Daniel 4:35, Ephesians 1:11) and yet as a perfectly free agent, free from any outside constraint, He cannot sin as it against His nature. So God does not have the power of contrary choice! Thus the power of contrary choice in man was for the purpose of his probation, and not to preserve him as a true man. In agreeing that man in blessedness cannot do wrong, Miley is inconsistent in insisting that man on earth *must* have the power of contrary choice if he is to be a responsible free agent.

In this connection it is necessary to determine what was the nature of Adam's created holiness. The Scripture declares that man was made good (Genesis 1:31), upright (Ecclesiastes 7:29). Does this state have an ethical quality? The uprightness with which Adam was created in contrasted to the plans (or devices) that all men are seeking out. The clear implication is that these plans are contrary to the will of God, and this evil; thus his uprightness must also have an ethical quality. Apart from this exegesis, moral neutrality is an impossibility. The image in which a man is re-created in Christ is a moral image, 'after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness' (Ephesians 4:24, RSV). This implies that the original condition of man was one of positive holiness.²⁷

If the above argument is true, it follows that man being created positively holy does not deny his freedom. Thus it is possible to be in a positive ethical condition without having

²⁴ *ibid.* 2:277.

²⁵ Douglas, J. D. ed., *The New Bible Dictionary* (London: IVF, 1962, 1st. edition), 509.

²⁶ Murray, John, *Collected Writings of John Murray, 2: Systematic Theology* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1977), 63.

²⁷ Berkhof, Louis, *Systematic Theology* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 204.

freely acted. It is this that Miley denies.

In ethical character we become by free personal action what we could not be constituted by the divine agency. Only in the former mode can moral merit or demerit arise.²⁸

In conclusion, contrary to Miley, the Scriptural concept of freedom does not necessitate contrary choice nor deny man's creation as positively holy. Whether or not these conclusions can be adequately explained in terms of each other is not the point of the issue, for they are **all** clearly Scriptural.

(c) Free agency after the fall

It must be firmly maintained that Adam was still a free agent after he had fallen into sin. Miley is certain, however, that this position is antagonistic to the Calvinistic teaching that man is unable, as a sinner, to do what is spiritually good.²⁹ But it has already been shown that freedom and inability are not of necessity contrary principles. If Adam would have been confirmed in his holiness if he had obeyed, then it is not unreasonable to assert that by his sin he is 'confirmed' in evil, without the power of contrary choice, which is not of the essence of free agency anyway. By his sin man has become depraved, with an evil heart (Jeremiah 17:9). And because his character and conduct are determined by the condition of his heart he is unable to will anything good.³⁰ Sinful man does not sin by constraint. He does evil because he wills to do evil. It is his own free and voluntary choice, and thus he is responsible for his actions. It cannot be controverted that Scripture both teaches the responsibility of man for his sinful actions and that he is unable to do any good. This God continues to command repentance, for example (see Acts 17:30-31). Yet man is totally unable to comply with the command (Romans 8:7-8, John 6:44,65).

Miley strenuously objects that God could not be so unjust as to hold me responsible for something I am unable to do. For Miley this is again a gross form of necessity.³¹ Cunningham addresses this very problem.

...man is responsible for not willing and doing good, notwithstanding his actual inability to will and to do good, because he is answerable for the inability itself, having, as legally responsible for Adam's sin, inherited the inability, as part of the forfeiture penally due to that first transgression.

Man, or the human race, as represented in Adam, had ability to do what is good, and lost it by his sin; and that, therefore, he is responsible for the want of it...³²

The deepest answer that can be given to Miley's objection is thus founded in the fact of the imputation of Adam's sin to the whole human race. Paul makes it very clear that through the one sin of Adam all men are under condemnation (Romans 5:16), are under the reign of death (v. 17), and have been made sinners (v. 19). It is an interesting fact that while Miley denies the imputation of Adam's sin, he makes no attempt at a thorough exegesis of Romans 5:12-21!

On the agreed principle that 'no just constitution will punish the innocent', Miley voices a

²⁸ *ibid.* 1:412.

²⁹ see *Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter 9, Section 2.

³⁰ Cunningham, William, *Historical Theology* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1962), 2:587.

³¹ Miley, *op. cit.* 2:280.

³² Cunningham, *op. cit.* 2:610,611.

further objection that the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to the whole human race makes guilty and actually condemns a people who are innocent, for Adam's sin was in no sense their own. But Miley is certainly wrong when he writes that the representative union of all mankind with Adam denies 'all direct sharing of the race in either the act or the demerit of Adam's sin.³³ Murray points out the confusion in this statement. Natural (or seminal) union and representative union are not mutually exclusive concepts. The representative view also firmly maintains the natural headship of Adam through which all men inherit a corrupt nature, but insists that Adam's sin is impute to all because he is the representative head of all.³⁴ The sin, condemnation and death which has passed to all men is the result of Adam's one sin alone (Romans 5:12,15-19). What was so special about this one sin of Adam as opposed to all the other sins he committed before the birth of his first-born? If we are guilty because we act according to the nature we have inherited from Adam, then Adam's first sin cannot have this all-important significance. Thus it is clear that all men **are** condemned in the sight of God just because Adam sinned. No man is innocent because by imputation all men are made sinners (v. 19). It is no different from the fact that when Christ's righteousness is imputed to His people they become positively righteous before God (v. 19, 2 Corinthians 5:21). Thus imputation, inability and demerit for Adam's sin are not opposed to the Biblical doctrine of free agency and responsibility, as both sides are clearly Biblical.

(d) Free agency in regeneration

Being mistaken as to the true Biblical teaching of the essence of free agency, that it is compatible with the lack of power of contrary choice and of inability to do good, it is impossible that Miley should have a true understanding of regeneration. From the acknowledged fact that evil men are entreated throughout the Scriptures, he writes:

But it is all groundless and without possible result, except as the evil have the capacity for moral and religious motives, and a power of personal agency whereby they may place their minds in such relation to the good that it shall be apprehended in the moral reason and in a profound conscious interest as supremely eligible.³⁵

But it has already been shown that while man *is* unable (see Job 14:4, Jeremiah 13:23, Matthew 7:16-18, 1 Corinthians 2:14), he is nevertheless answerable to God for this inability to obey what God commands him. How can a just God command something that man is unable to do? Adam, as created was able to obey God's moral law, but although men are now in a different condition, by the free exercise of their own responsible volitions, the obligation to obey is not removed or invalidated. Indeed, the continual promulgation of the commands has, in the purpose of God, a great end in view.

If men are really unable to discharge the duties incumbent upon them, it is important that they should be aware of this feature in their condition; and the only means of securing this, in accordance with the principles of their constitution as rational beings, is by requiring them to do what is obligatory upon them.³⁶

Similarly with the command of God to man to repent and be saved.

³³ Miley, op. cit. 1:503.

³⁴ Murray, John, *The Imputation of Adam's Sin* (Philipsburg, N. J.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1992), 36-37.

³⁵ Miley, op. cit. 1:306.

³⁶ Cunningham, op. cit. 1:593.

That a man has no part in his regeneration is quite in accord with his having free agency. Neither must it be supposed that God's elect are regenerated against their wills, for God makes a man willing by renewing his will, that is, by making his will good in the place of bad. So that in this process, while man is wholly passive, due regard is paid to the fact that he is a rational being. Miley admits that regeneration is the work of the Holy Spirit, but denies that man has no 'ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation'.³⁷ He must overlook plain Scriptural teaching on this point for his original idea of freedom precludes it. But man's inability is not tantamount to a denial of his free agency. Man only has the power of contrary choice once again *after* he has been regenerated.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Miley's anthropology rests upon the very shaky foundation of free agency, rather than on the unshakableness of God's sovereignty. His definition of free agency (freedom) is philosophically, not Biblically, determined. It is assumed throughout that unless man **always** has the power of contrary choice he is no longer a true man, in the sense that he is a free and responsible moral agent. But Murray has explicitly and conclusively shown that 'the power of contrary choice is not the essence of free agency'. The analogous examples of man in blessedness, the angels and God Himself, are an ample confirmation of this point. If this point can be sustained then man can be unable to do good (as in his depraved state), or evil (as in heaven), and still be very much acting freely.

This does not imply that depraved man can not make any choices. He does have the power of alternative choice, whereby he is able to choose between two evils. In the realm of bondage there are still so many things to choose! Despite his denials to the contrary, Miley does separate the choices that a man makes from his nature. Calvinistic theologians, however, insist that although the essence of free agency is action without compulsion from without, such action is in accordance with the nature (or character) of the agent involved. Thus there is a certain necessity, that of acting in accordance with our natures.

It is at this very point that all Miley's objections focus. The very suggestion of necessity in any form is so repugnant that it is summarily rejected. Whether or not Scripture warrants such an immediate denial is not considered. In fact, all we do is foreordained by God (see Psalm 15:3, 135:6, Isaiah 14:24,27, 46:9-11, Acts 2:23, 4:28, etc.). Though all-inclusive, foreordination does not deprive man of his free agency in making voluntary decisions by which he is responsible for his actions. Both are taught in Scripture and must be accepted on this authority alone whether or not they can be understood or reconciled by the human mind. Murray observes that contingency is necessary to the kind of freedom Miley wants to attribute to man. Yet it is only in the realm of God's providence that our free agency is a fact and only thus that it is maintained, for in God we "live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28, RSV). Unless it is God who is sovereignly ruling according to His own will, then blind fate is our master, and that is a much worse form of necessity than Miley attributes to the Calvinistic system. However, the question of necessity is not the fundamental point at issue. Cunningham himself believed that there was a necessary connection between men's motives and their volitions (the doctrine of necessity), but he did not regard it as a teaching which could be finally proved from Scripture and this did not demand that it be believed. He

³⁷ *The Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter 9, Section 2.

³⁸ Cunningham, William, *Historical Theology* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1967), 483,515.

did accept that the only form of necessity taught in the Scripture is 'the servitude or bondage of the will of man to sin because of depravity'.³⁸ The real issue concerns the Biblical doctrine of freedom, whether or not this entails any notion of necessity. And it is this doctrine of freedom which has been shown to be in complete harmony with the sovereignty of God.

In summary, a table of the opposing view of the Calvinistic and Arminian systems is given in order to show clearly how everything depends on the primary definition of free agency.

	ARMINIANISM	CALVINISM
FREE AGENCY	Contrary choice is its essence	Contrary choice is not its essence
MAN AS CREATED	Subjective holiness until free action	Ethical holiness
MAN AS FALLEN	Subjective depravity until free action, atonement makes free choice for all possible	Ethical depravity by Adam's sin, total inability to do anything good
MAN AS REGENERATED	Work of Spirit in regeneration depends on man's free choice	Man can do nothing until regenerated, then power of contrary choice

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